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THE FACTS 
 
The case of Lotfi Raissi, an Algerian pilot, who was denied compensation 
under the ex gratia scheme has been reported by many national newspapers. It 
is likely that we have not heard the last of it, as it is possible for the Secretary 
of State to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal to the House of 
Lords. The case1 concerned a judicial review appeal application by Mr Raissi. 
On September 21st 2001, he was arrested in his home following a letter dated 
September 17th 2001, from the United States Embassy in London addressed 
to the Metropolitan Police asking them for information about him. The FBI 
believed that Raissi may have been involved in the September 11th 2001 
atrocities. There was also a further request, from the United States Embassy to 
the United Kingdom government on September 27th 2001, to arrest Raissi for 
extradition purposes. It was alleged that he had given false information to the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) when he wanted to renew his licence.   
Mr Raissi was born in Algeria and is married to a French national. He was 
residing in the United Kingdom at the time of his arrest. In 1997, he had 
qualified as a commercial pilot in the United States and at the time of his 
arrest was a student at an aviation school in the UK undergoing training in 
order to obtain a European pilot licence. The information in the letter sent 
from the Embassy to the Metropolitan Police stated that Raissi had attended 
the Boeing 737 flight training at the aviation school in the spring of 2001. It 
also said that a named hijacker, Mr Hanjour, was also engaged in training at 
the aviation school at the same time as Raissi. Furthermore, it was alleged that 
both of them had spent considerable time on a flight simulator together. There 
was also a further suggestion that there was a link between a Mr Abu Doha, 
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who was to be extradited for terrorism offences by the United States’ 
government, and the appellant. The police allegedly found in Doha’s address 
book, a telephone number which was said to be that of Mr Raissi.  
Mr Raissi was detained for approximately four and half months in custody 
pursuant to extradition proceedings which had been initiated by the United 
States of America. He was later granted bail because the Crown Prosecution 
Service could not say whether, if at all, he would be charged with a terrorism 
offence. District Judge Workman, on April 24th 2002, before whom Raissi 
appeared, discharged all “draft extradition charges” against him. He said that 
the evidence showed only that the FAA ‘might have dealt’ with the 
application differently but there was insufficient evidence that the deception 
by Raissi was material. The detention and subsequent proceedings had a 
devastating effect on Raissi’s life, health and his reputation. He considered 
that to get his ‘life back together again’ there was a need for vindication and a 
public acknowledgement that he was not a terrorist. He therefore sought 
compensation through the ex gratia scheme.  
The ex gratia scheme was introduced in 1976 by Douglas Hurd2 as a 
discretionary monetary award payable to those who had been detained in 
custody following either a wrongful conviction or charge resulting from 
exceptional circumstances, including serious default by a member of a public 
authority, and /or the emergence of facts which completely exonerated the 
detained person. This scheme was introduced in response to the requirement 
set out in article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.3 The Home Secretary on the matter said:  
 
“I remain prepared to pay compensation to people who do not fall 
within the terms of the preceding paragraph but who have spent a 
period in custody following a wrongful conviction or charge, where I 
am satisfied that it has resulted from serious default on the part of a 
member of a police force or of some other public authority. There may 
be exceptional circumstances that justify compensation in cases 
outside these categories. In particular, facts that may emerge at trial, 
or on appeal within time, that completely exonerate the accused 
person. I am prepared, in principle, to pay compensation to people 
who have spent a period in custody or have been imprisoned in cases 
such as this. I will not however, be prepared to pay compensation 
simply because at the trial or on appeal the prosecution was unable to 
2 The then Home Secretary. 
3 GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) 1966. Came into force on March 23 1976. 
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sustain the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to 
the specific charge that was brought.”4
 
DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
 
In the Raissi application, counsel for the Home Secretary maintained that 
the scheme did not apply to him because the conduct of prosecutions in 
extradition cases is a matter in the hands of the foreign government requiring 
extradition. The Home Secretary stated further that United Kingdom 
prosecuting authorities were merely acting as a solicitor. Lord Justice Auld in 
deciding the matter agreed with the Home Secretary that the scheme was not 
construed under any statute and denied Raissi’s right to claim under the 
scheme. He said that the scheme arose from the Crown exercising its 
prerogative to compensate those who had been wronged under domestic law 
and did not extend to extradition proceedings. Auld LJ5 did not regard “the 
reasonable and literate person” formula as a helpful approach for determining 
on an objective basis what Mr Hurd had in mind when he originally 
formulated the ex gratia scheme. The primary concern of the court was to 
determine the intention of Mr Hurd and his successor as to the reach and the 
potential meaning of the scheme. Auld LJ was of the view that the 
circumstances of the detention of the applicant did not follow on from a 
wrongful conviction or charge within the meaning of the ex gratia scheme6 
and in support of the Home Secretary, he did not consider that Raissi’s case 
fell under the second limb of “exceptional circumstances.” Neither did he 
perceive abuse of the process by the CPS, nor of the court in conducting the 
proceedings on the extradition charges, nor in opposing bail in reliance on 
instruction about the terrorism allegation. Finally, Auld LJ did not consider 
that Mr Raissi was completely exonerated given the outcome of the 
extradition proceedings which was brought by the United States. Mr Raissi 
responded and filed an appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 R. Ex P Raissi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] All ER (D) 215 
(Feb) para 4. 
5 [2007] All ER (D) 278 (Feb) para 38. 
6 [2007] All ER (D) 278 (Feb) para 45. 
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DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The issues before the court of Appeal were: 
 
• Whether, as a matter of interpretation, the ex gratia scheme was 
capable of applying to detention in the context of extradition 
proceedings. 
 
• Whether there was evidence of serious default on the part of the 
police and/or the Crown Prosecution Service.   
 
• Whether, if the application failed under the serious default 
provision, the circumstances of the case were so exceptional that 
the Secretary of State ought to reconsider the application under 
the second paragraph of the scheme. 
 
Lord Justice Hooper gave judgement on behalf of the Court of Appeal on 
the February 14th 2008.  The Court of Appeal began by considering how 
policy statements such as the ex gratia scheme should be interpreted. They 
took their stand from an earlier decision in Webb7 in which Lawton LJ had 
said that the court should not construe the scheme as if it were a statute but as 
a “public announcement of what the government was willing to do.” This 
required the court to decide by employing the notion of a reasonable and 
literate man’s understanding of the circumstances, whether an applicant 
should be paid compensation for personal injury caused by a crime of 
violence or an abuse of process? This was the same test used by the lower 
court in their rejection of Raissi’s application. Theirs was based on their 
interpretation of the intention of the Minister at the time rather than on how 
his words would or might have been interpreted at a later date. The appeal 
court judges used the Webb text, although they accepted it could be worded 
and interpreted in a contemporary idiom to accommodate subsequent 
circumstances and cases. To assist them reach their conclusion they asked the 
following questions. What does the scheme mean? What is its purpose and 
scope?  And who is the person concerned that the Minister is intending to 
compensate? Since the scheme was not a statutory scheme it was for the 
board, as a fact-finding body to apply a reasonable and literate man's 
understanding of the circumstances in which compensation could be paid.         
Raissi’s contention was that the extradition charges which he faced were a 
device to allow for his detention in custody whilst the United States 
authorities investigated whether he was involved in the 9/11 atrocities. The 
7 R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p Webb [1987] QB 74, at 78. 
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charges he claimed were trivial and, of themselves, would never have 
warranted extradition proceedings or even detention in custody.  He claimed 
that the way in which the proceedings were advanced against him amounted 
to a serious default by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and/or officers of 
the Metropolitan Police. Further, the appellant contended that his four and 
half months detention on trivial extradition charges was a breach of Article 5 
of the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) and a device to 
circumnavigate the law of the UK, which otherwise would have not permitted 
a person being held without charge as a suspect for terrorism offences for 
more than 7 days (as the law then stood). As such, it was an abuse of the 
process of the court, which should entitle him to be compensated under the 
scheme. 
The Court of Appeal said that the Divisional Court had adopted the wrong 
approach in the sense that the purpose of the scheme should not be interpreted 
in a legalistic manner but interpreted purposively. The appeal court observed 
that in extradition proceedings the defendant faced the charges in a UK court 
and that the purpose was to determine whether he should lose his liberty, or 
not. If afterwards he was not extradited as a result of serious default of a 
member of a public authority, the Court of Appeal said, “ the wrong done to 
him would be indistinguishable from the wrong done to a defendant who was 
in custody due to a charge in a domestic criminal court.”8 In their view it 
would be difficult to exclude wrongful detention (resulting from the 
extradition process) from the scheme because the false information provided 
by the CPS or a police officer would to a large extent result in a miscarriage 
of justice and unjustifiable loss of liberty and the purpose of the scheme 
should include this type of situation. 
On the second point of serious default, counsel for the Home Secretary 
submitted that there was no compelling evidence that the proceedings were 
brought for an ‘ulterior motive.’ The Home Secretary, went further, 
submitting that even if it was for an ulterior motive, it was not the fault of the 
British authorities since they were acting on behalf of the United States. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the CPS’s primary duty is to the court and this 
would include a duty to ensure that the requesting state complies with its duty 
of disclosure.9 The case of R. Ex P United States v Bow Street Magistrates 
Court10 was relied on, where the judge said, “the appropriate course for the 
judge to take if he has reason to believe that an abuse of process may have 
occurred is to call upon the judicial authority that has issued the foreign arrest 
warrant or the State seeking extradition in a part 2 case, for whatever 
8 Para 125. 
9 Para 139. 
10 [2006] EWHC 2256 (Admin). 
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information or evidence the judge requires in order to determine whether an 
abuse of process has occurred or not.”11 The Court of Appeal also held that 
the fact that a judge cannot order the requesting state to make disclosure does 
not exonerate the CPS from the “duty of candour and good faith” it owes to 
the court, particularly when the issue before the court is the lawfulness under 
Article 5 of the ECHR of the detention of the person whose extradition is 
being sought.  
 Lastly on the “exceptional circumstances” point, counsel for the Home 
Secretary argued that the appellant’s case did not fall under exceptional 
circumstances because he had not been completely exonerated of all the 
charges. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that it would be irrational for 
the Home Secretary to draw a distinction between charges brought in the 
context of extradition proceedings and one brought in the context of domestic 
proceedings, and that there is a need for the Home Secretary to consider a 
case of this kind where the substance of the charge against the appellant 
which resulted in his loss of liberty was that he was a terrorist, a charge of 
which he had been completely exonerated.  They concluded that that there 
was a considerable body of evidence to suggest that the police and CPS were 
responsible for serious default and as such the ex gratia scheme must apply 
requiring the Home Secretary to reconsider his decision in the light of the 
court’s ruling as to the scope of the scheme. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
There are three points that emerge from this case. First, there is clearly an 
abuse of Article 5 of the ECHR, which provides that everyone has a right to 
liberty and security. Even in circumstances where the authorities are allowed 
to deprive someone of his or her liberty,12 he or she is entitled to be told of the 
charges levelled against him or her in the manner and language he or she will 
understand.13 Mr Raissi was held on extradition charges without knowing in 
detail what offences he was supposed to have committed. The CPS assertion 
that they were only acting as the legal representative of the US authorities is 
unsatisfactory. What is the implication of what they were saying? Does that 
mean US laws and actions supersede those of the UK? Even the Extradition 
Act 2003 allows that the extradition warrant should have among other 
requirements the particulars of the circumstances in which the person is 
allegedly to have committed the offence, including the time, and place at 
11 Ibid, at para 89. 
12 ECHR, Art 5(1)(f). 
13 ECHR, Art 5(2).  
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which he was alleged to have committed the offence.14 Are the UK authorities 
afraid of the US to the extent of sacrificing their citizens without proper 
evidence that the citizen has committed the offence?  Lord Anderson of 
Swansea during the House of Lords debate15 on July 4th 2006 said this:  
 
“My Lords, does it not shriek with injustice and is it not grossly unfair 
that British citizens can be extradited to the US by the expedited 
process under the treaty, when the UK Government will have to 
provide prima facie evidence to the US? That is not, as my noble 
friend suggests, a rebalancing. Should we not have ensured at the time 
of negotiation that there was reciprocity in the coming into operation 
of the obligations? Would it not make sense and be just for us to give 
adequate notice to our US partners under the treaty that we intend to 
suspend its operation until such time as the US Senate ratifies it and 
puts the same obligations on their citizens as we have imposed on 
ours?”  
 
The second point to consider is whether Raissi was guilty by association. 
One cannot but ask what the actual offence of Mr Raissi was. Was he guilty 
by associating with another student at the aviation school? The evidence 
shows that although Raissi went to the same aviation school with the alleged 
bombers, their training was held at different times. Even if they were in the 
same plane undertaking the same type of training at the same time, does that 
mean Raissi is automatically a bomber? The only information linking Raissi 
to Mr Abu was an address book with the supposed phone number of Mr 
Raissi. The evidence presented did not even establish the truth of this 
assertion.  
The Court of Appeal themselves noted that Raissi’s remand in custody for 
a considerable period in those circumstances was likely to be a breach of 
Article 5. They found it difficult to understand how detention for several 
weeks could be lawful on charges, of which the court would not have denied 
him release on bail. But they failed to reach a firm conclusion on this point 
because the CPS or police were not represented before the court. Maybe had 
their Lordships reached a firm conclusion, they could have also supported 
their judgement with the judicial remedy provided for in Article 5(5) of the 
‘ECHR’ “Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in 
contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right 
to compensation.” 
14 Extradition Act 2003, s 4(c). 
15 www.parliament.uk 
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Finally, peradventure a further appeal to the House of Lords comes down 
in favour of the Home Secretary that extradition charges did not fall within 
the scope of ex gratia scheme. What then will happen to people like Mr Raissi 
who are wrongly accused by the CPS? What genuine justification did the CPS 
have for the loss of liberty experienced by the appellant? Looking at it 
critically both the UK and US governments were negligent in their 
investigation procedure in that most of the information they provided was 
false and the UK government did not take reasonable steps to ascertain that 
the allegations were true prior to making the arrest. The Court of Appeal 
observed that the letter from the United States to the Metropolitan police was 
for the purpose of requiring the police to make discrete enquiries about Raissi 
but without arresting him. Also, that the extradition charges against Raissi 
were a means of taking him to the United States to question him about the 
9/11 atrocity and not for the original non disclosure offence.  
 
 
